H5N1 Viruses and Vaccines by Subbarao, Kanta & Luke, Catherine
Opinion
H5N1 Viruses and Vaccines
Kanta Subbarao*, Catherine Luke
T
he establishment and spread of highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype
in birds and coincident infections in humans since
2003 have raised concerns that we may be facing an inﬂuenza
pandemic caused by an H5N1 inﬂuenza virus. In this brief
Opinion piece, we consider the pandemic threat posed by
H5N1 viruses and review the published data on the evaluation
of H5N1 vaccines in preclinical and clinical studies.
HPAI H5N1 viruses have been isolated from avian species
in more than 50 countries. As of 29 January 2007, 270
laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of H5N1 infection in humans had
been reported by the World Health Organization, 164 of
which were fatal [1], resulting in a case fatality rate of
approximately 60%.
In order to cause a pandemic, H5N1 viruses will have to
acquire the ability to transmit efﬁciently from person to
person. The H5 hemagglutinin (HA) is found in inﬂuenza
viruses that typically infect avian species, so efﬁcient person-
to-person spread could happen if the H5N1 virus reassorts, or
exchanges genes, with circulating human inﬂuenza viruses
giving rise to a virus with the H5 HA (to which the population
is not immune) in a gene constellation that confers the
property of transmissibility. Alternatively, efﬁcient person-
to-person spread could occur if the H5N1 virus evolves and
adapts to more efﬁcient replication and transmissibility in
the human population.
Two observations have led to questions about the
likelihood of a reassortant H5N1 virus causing a pandemic.
First, reassortant viruses have not been isolated despite
ongoing H5N1 outbreaks in birds and infections in humans,
even with concurrent circulation of human inﬂuenza viruses
since 2003. Second, laboratory studies have found that
reassortant viruses that derived the surface glycoprotein
genes from an H5N1 virus and internal protein genes from an
H3N2 inﬂuenza A virus were not efﬁciently transmitted and
were somewhat less infectious to ferrets (an animal model for
human inﬂuenza) than the wild-type H5N1 viruses [2]. The
concern that an H5N1 virus could adapt to the human host
and acquire mutations that confer transmissibility prompts
very careful analysis of each cluster of human H5N1
infections that is reported ( [1,3–5]). At present, the data
suggest that human-to-human transmission is inefﬁcient and
very limited. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of public
health preparedness, it is important to move forward in
developing approaches for dealing with H5N1 in humans.
Vaccination is the preferred strategy for prevention and
control of inﬂuenza. The most expeditious way to generate an
H5N1 vaccine is to use licensed technology, such as
inactivated or live attenuated vaccines. However, several
practical and scientiﬁc challenges to the development of
H5N1 vaccines exist. These include high pathogenicity of
wild-type H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses, reduced yield of candidate
vaccine viruses in embryonated hens’ eggs compared to that
of human inﬂuenza viruses, limited manufacturing capacity,
and poor immunogenicity of the H5 HA. Despite these
obstacles, several approaches have been used to generate
candidate vaccines and a few have advanced to clinical trials
(Table 1). Table 1 also includes data published on vaccines
that are being developed for veterinary use.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant scientiﬁc challenge for the
development and licensure of pandemic vaccines for humans
is that assessment of vaccine efﬁcacy for humans will have to
be inferred from preclinical studies in experimental animals
and immunogenicity studies in humans, as it will not be
possible to assess the efﬁcacy of a pandemic vaccine in a
clinical trial before a pandemic begins. Table 2 summarizes
the preclinical and clinical ﬁndings from inactivated H5N1
vaccines evaluated in humans to date. Preclinical studies of
inﬂuenza vaccines are generally conducted in mice or ferrets.
In most cases, the 1997 and 2003 H5N1 vaccine candidates
were promising in terms of immunogenicity and efﬁcacy,
with complete protection of animals from lethal H5N1
infection, and signiﬁcant, if not complete, reduction of
pulmonary viral replication following challenge. Preclinical
data in ferrets have not been published on the 2004 H5N1
vaccines that were evaluated in clinical trials, so data are not
available to directly assess how accurately preclinical studies
would have predicted the outcome of evaluation of these
vaccines in humans.
In clinical trials, inactivated virus vaccines based on H5N1
viruses isolated in 2004 [6,7], a recombinant H5 HA subunit
vaccine based on an H5N1 virus isolated in 1997 expressed in
a baculovirus vector [8], and an inactivated virus vaccine
based on a surrogate low pathogenicity avian H5N3 virus [9–
11], were poorly immunogenic when administered to
volunteers without adjuvant. Clinical trials of H1N1 inﬂuenza
vaccines in 1977 established that whole virion vaccines are
more immunogenic than split-virion vaccines (in which the
virus particles are disrupted by detergent treatment to obtain
a preparation enriched for the surface antigens) [12,13];
however, the former are also more reactogenic than the
latter. Consistent with this observation, in recent trials in
humans of an alum-adjuvanted inactivated H5N1 virus
vaccine, much lower doses of a whole virion vaccine elicited
higher levels of antibody compared to a split-virion vaccine
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PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org March 2007 | Volume 3 | Issue 3 | e40 0001Table 1. Vaccine Strategies against H5N1 Influenza that Have Been Evaluated in Preclinical and Clinical Studies
Type of Vaccine Published Studies in which Indicated
Vaccine Has Been Evaluated
Intended Use References
Preclinical Studies Clinical Trials
Inactivated whole virus UU Human [14–20]
Inactivated subvirion ß U Human [6,7]
Inactivated, surrogate low
pathogenicity avian H5 virus
UU Human [9–11,21–23]
Live attenuated virus U ß Human [24–27]
Subunit (surface glycoprotein
preparation or recombinant H5 HA)
UU
a Human [8,28]
Adenovirus vectored H5 U ß Human and veterinary [29,30]
Fowlpox vectored H5 U ß Veterinary [31,32]
Newcastle disease virus vectored H5 U ß Veterinary [33,34]
DNA (H5 or NP/M) U ß Human [35,36]
aRecombinant H5 HA [8].
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.0030040.t001
Table 2. Summary of Preclinical and Clinical Findings for Inactivated H5N1 Virus Vaccines Evaluated in Humans





Two doses 6 alum required to elicit HI Ab in 65% of
mice; detected Ab cross-reactive with H5N1 viruses.
Two doses of 7.5, 15, or 30 lg ,3w k
apart, with or without MF59 adjuvant.
[9–11,21,23]
High degree of protection from lethality, pulmonary and
extrapulmonary infection following challenge.
Vaccine was well-tolerated at all doses.
Poorly immunogenic without adjuvant.
A/VN/1203/2004
PR8 reassortant
None published Two doses of 90, 45, 15, or 7.5 lg
4 wk apart.
[6]
Vaccine was well tolerated.
Two doses of 90 lg elicited NAb in 54%
of individuals and HI Ab titers 1:40
in 58% of individuals.
A/VN/1194/2004
PR8 reassortant
None published 7.5, 15, or 30 lg, 2 doses, 3 wk apart,
with or without alum adjuvant.
[7]
Vaccine was well tolerated.
Highest Ab responses were seen after





In mice, a single dose of 7 or 15 lg with incomplete Freund’s
adjuvant elicited high levels of HI Ab and NAb and provided
protection from pulmonary virus replication and lethal
challenge. In ferrets, one dose (7 lgo r1 5lg) with alum
adjuvant or two doses without adjuvant (7 lg) induced a
protective Ab response and complete protection from lethal
challenge with homologous wild-type virus, with significantly
reduced lung virus titers. All ferrets were protected from





None published Two doses of 1.25, 2.5, 5, or 10 lgH A
with aluminum hydroxide 4 wk apart.
[14]
Vaccines were well tolerated.
Ab was detected after one dose, and
two doses of 10 lg resulted in
seropositivity in 78% of individuals.
Two doses of all doses met EMEA
requirements for seasonal influenza
vaccine licensing.
Ab, antibody; EMEA, European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products; HI, hemagglutination inhibiting; NAb, neutralizing antibody; PR8, Influenza A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (H1N1).
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.0030040.t002
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H5N1 Viruses and Vaccines[7,14]. Despite the fact that the difference in immunogenicity
of whole virion and split-virion vaccines was well established,
preclinical studies of inactivated H5 virus vaccines in mice
and ferrets have generally been performed using whole virion
preparations with adjuvant, while the vaccine preparation
evaluated in clinical trials is a puriﬁed split-virion vaccine. It
is important to note that preclinical data will not be
predictive of clinical trial results if the vaccine formulations
that are tested in preclinical studies are different from those
evaluated in clinical trials.
Clinical trials have demonstrated that the immunogenicity
of H5 vaccines can be enhanced by an increased dose of the
HA, the use of adjuvants, use of multiple doses, or use of a
whole virion vaccine. More studies are needed to directly
compare ﬁndings from preclinical and clinical evaluation of
pandemic inﬂuenza vaccines to establish whether animal
models can be used to guide decisions on which vaccine
candidates to take forward for evaluation in humans.
Although there is no evidence that H5N1 viruses have yet
acquired pandemic potential, the consequences of such an
event are serious enough that preparation for a possible
pandemic is essential. &
Acknowledgments
Author contributions. KS and CL wrote the paper.
Funding. This research was supported in part by the Intramural
Research Program of the US National Institutes of Health, National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
Competing interests. Our laboratory has a cooperative research
and development agreement with MedImmune Vaccines to develop
vaccines against potential pandemic strains of inﬂuenza.
References
1. World Health Organization (2007) Disease outbreak news. Available:
http://www.who.int/csr/don/en. Accessed 2 February 2007.
2. Maines TR, Chen LM, Matsuoka Y, Chen H, Rowe T, et al. (2006) Lack of
transmission of H5N1 avian-human reassortant inﬂuenza viruses in a
ferret model. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103: 12121–12126.
3. Ungchusak K, Auewarakul P, Dowell SF, Kitphati R, Auwanit W, et al.
(2005) Probable person-to-person transmission of avian inﬂuenza A
(H5N1). N Engl J Med 352: 333–340.
4. Oner AF, Bay A, Arslan S, Akdeniz H, Sahin HA, et al. (2006) Avian
inﬂuenza A (H5N1) infection in eastern Turkey in 2006. N Engl J Med 355:
2179–2185.
5. Kandun IN, Wibisono H, Sedyaningsih ER, Yusharmen, Hadisoedarsuno
W, et al. (2006) Three Indonesian clusters of H5N1 virus infection in 2005.
N Engl J Med 355: 2186–2194.
6. Treanor JJ, Campbell JD, Zangwill KM, Rowe T, Wolff M (2006) Safety and
immunogenicity of an inactivated subvirion inﬂuenza A (H5N1) vaccine. N
Engl J Med 354: 1343–1351.
7. Bresson JL, Perronne C, Launay O, Gerdil C, Saville M, et al. (2006) Safety
and immunogenicity of an inactivated split-virion inﬂuenza A/Vietnam/
1194/2004(H5N1)vaccine:PhaseIrandomisedtrial.Lancet367:1657–1664.
8. Treanor JJ, Wilkinson BE, Masseoud F, Hu-Primmer J, Battaglia R, et al.
(2001) Safety and immunogenicity of a recombinant hemagglutinin
vaccine for H5 inﬂuenza in humans. Vaccine 19: 1732–1737.
9. Nicholson KG, Colegate AE, Podda A, Stephenson I, Wood J, et al. (2001)
Safety and antigenicity of non-adjuvanted and MF59-adjuvanted inﬂuenza
A/Duck/Singapore/97 (H5N3) vaccine: A randomised trial of two potential
vaccines against H5N1 inﬂuenza. Lancet 357: 1937–1943.
10. Stephenson I, Nicholson KG, Colegate A, Podda A, Wood J, et al. (2003)
Boosting immunity to inﬂuenza H5N1 with MF59-adjuvanted H5N3 A/
Duck/Singapore/97 vaccine in a primed human population. Vaccine 21:
1687–1693.
11. Stephenson I, Bugarini R, Nicholson KG, Podda A, Wood JM, et al. (2005)
Cross-reactivity to highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza H5N1 viruses after
vaccination with nonadjuvanted and MF59-adjuvanted inﬂuenza A/Duck/
Singapore/97 (H5N3) Vaccine: A potential priming strategy. J Infect Dis
191: 1210–1215.
12. Wright PF, Dolin R, La Montagne JR (1976) From the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health, the
Center for Disease Control, and the Bureau of Biologics of the Food and
Drug Administration. Summary of clinical trials of inﬂuenza vaccines–II. J
Infect Dis 134: 633–638.
13. Wright PF, Thompson J, Vaughn WK, Folland DS, Sell SH, et al. (1977)
Trials of inﬂuenza A/New Jersey/76 virus vaccine in normal children: An
overview of age-related antigenicity and reactogenicity. J Infect Dis 136
Suppl: S731–S741.
14. Lin J, Zhang J, Dong X, Fang H, Chen J, et al. (2006) Safety and




generated by plasmid-based reverse genetics. Virology 305: 192–200.
16. Webby RJ, Perez DR, Coleman JS, Guan Y, Knight JH, et al. (2004)
Responsiveness to a pandemic alert: Use of reverse genetics for rapid
development of inﬂuenza vaccines. Lancet 363: 1099–1103.
17. Lipatov AS, Webby RJ, Govorkova EA, Krauss S, Webster RG (2005)
Efﬁcacy of H5 inﬂuenza vaccines produced by reverse genetics in a lethal
mouse model. J Infect Dis 191: 1216–1220.
18. Nicolson C, Major D, Wood JM, Robertson JS (2005) Generation of
inﬂuenza vaccine viruses on Vero cells by reverse genetics: An H5N1
candidate vaccine strain produced under a quality system. Vaccine 23:
2943–2952.
19. Govorkova EA, Webby RJ, Humberd J, Seiler JP, Webster RG (2006)
Immunization with reverse-genetics-produced H5N1 inﬂuenza vaccine
protects ferrets against homologous and heterologous challenge. J Infect
Dis 194: 159–167.
20. Horimoto T, Takada A, Fujii K, Goto H, Hatta M, et al. (2006) The
development and characterization of H5 inﬂuenza virus vaccines derived
from a 2003 human isolate. Vaccine 24: 3669–3676.
21. Lu X, Tumpey TM, Morken T, Zaki SR, Cox NJ, et al. (1999) A mouse
model for the evaluation of pathogenesis and immunity to inﬂuenza A
(H5N1) viruses isolated from humans. J Virol 73: 5903–5911.
22. Takada A, Kuboki N, Okazaki K, Ninomiya A, Tanaka H, et al. (1999)
Avirulent avian inﬂuenza virus as a vaccine strain against a potential
human pandemic. J Virol 73: 8303–8307.
23. Lipatov AS, Hoffmann E, Salomon R, Yen HL, Webster RG (2006) Cross-
protectiveness and immunogenicity of inﬂuenza A/Duck/Singapore/3/
97(H5) vaccines against infection with A/Vietnam/1203/04(H5N1) virus in
ferrets. J Infect Dis 194: 1040–1043.
24. Li S, Liu C, Klimov A, Subbarao K, Perdue ML, et al. (1999) Recombinant
inﬂuenza A virus vaccines for the pathogenic human A/Hong Kong/97
(H5N1) viruses. J Infect Dis 179: 1132–1138.
25. Lu X, Edwards LE, Desheva JA, Nguyen DC, Rekstin A, et al. (2006) Cross-
protective immunity in mice induced by live-attenuated or inactivated
vaccines against highly pathogenic inﬂuenza A (H5N1) viruses. Vaccine 24:
6588–6593.
26. Desheva JA, Lu XH, Rekstin AR, Rudenko LG, Swayne DE, et al. (2006)
Characterization of an inﬂuenza A H5N2 reassortant as a candidate for
live-attenuated and inactivated vaccines against highly pathogenic H5N1
viruses with pandemic potential. Vaccine 24: 6859–6866.
27. Suguitan AL Jr, McAuliffe J, Mills KL, Jin H, Duke G, et al. (2006) Live,
attenuated inﬂuenza A H5N1 candidate vaccines provide broad cross-
protection in mice and ferrets. PLoS Med 3: e360. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.0030360
28. Rimmelzwaan GF, Claas EC, van Amerongen G, de Jong JC, Osterhaus AD
(1999) ISCOM vaccine induced protection against a lethal challenge with a
human H5N1 inﬂuenza virus. Vaccine 17: 1355–1358.
29. Gao W, Soloff AC, Lu X, Montecalvo A, Nguyen DC, et al. (2006)
Protection of mice and poultry from lethal H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus
through adenovirus-based immunization. J Virol 80: 1959–1964.
30. Hoelscher MA, Garg S, Bangari DS, Belser JA, Lu X, et al. (2006)
Development of adenoviral-vector-based pandemic inﬂuenza vaccine
against antigenically distinct human H5N1 strains in mice. Lancet 367:
475–481.
31. Qiao CL, Yu KZ, Jiang YP, Jia YQ, Tian GB, et al. (2003) Protection of
chickens against highly lethal H5N1 and H7N1 avian inﬂuenza viruses with
a recombinant fowlpox virus co-expressing H5 haemagglutinin and N1
neuraminidase genes. Avian Pathol 32: 25–32.
32. Karaca K, Swayne DE, Grosenbaugh D, Bublot M, Robles A, et al. (2005)
Immunogenicity of fowlpox virus expressing the avian inﬂuenza virus H5
gene (TROVAC AIV-H5) in cats. Clin Diagn Lab Immunol 12: 1340–1342.
33. Veits J, Wiesner D, Fuchs W, Hoffmann B, Granzow H, et al. (2006)
Newcastle disease virus expressing H5 hemagglutinin gene protects
chickens against Newcastle disease and avian inﬂuenza. Proc Natl Acad Sci
U S A 103: 8197–8202.
34. Ge J, Deng G, Wen Z, Tian G, Wang Y, et al. (2007) Newcastle disease virus-
based live attenuated vaccine completely protects chickens and mice from
lethal challenge of homologous and heterologous H5N1 avian inﬂuenza
viruses. J Virol 81: 150–158.
35. Kodihalli S, Goto H, Kobasa DL, Krauss S, Kawaoka Y, et al. (1999) DNA
vaccine encoding hemagglutinin provides protective immunity against
H5N1 inﬂuenza virus infection in mice. J Virol 73: 2094–2098.
36. Epstein SL, Tumpey TM, Misplon JA, Lo CY, Cooper LA, et al. (2002) DNA
vaccine expressing conserved inﬂuenza virus proteins protective against
H5N1 challenge infection in mice. Emerg Infect Dis 8: 796–801.
PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org March 2007 | Volume 3 | Issue 3 | e40 0003
H5N1 Viruses and Vaccines